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Defenders of health insurance reform might rightly claim that blood will be 
on the hands of a court that strikes down the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA).1 Because insurance is necessary for decent access to 
healthcare, some analysts estimate that being uninsured kills 20,000 or more 
people a year.2 Considering that the ACA reduces the number of uninsured by 
more than half,3 it stands to reason that eliminating the ACA could cost more 
than 10,000 lives a year. Even if only the individual mandate were stricken, 
thousands could die each year, according to estimates that the ensuing market 
chaos would cut the Act’s insurance gains in half.4 
As sobering as these statistics are, far more chilling is the loss of life that 
might result from the constitutional precedent that a negative ACA ruling could 
set. The challengers’ chief argument is that the Commerce Clause confers no 
federal authority—no matter how dire the necessity—simply to mandate 
behavior, unconditioned on citizens engaging in some economic activity. This 
argument’s frightening prospect is that this very power might someday be 
absolutely essential to saving a million or more lives, based on solid public 
health science, in the event of a catastrophic public health emergency. 
Imagine, for instance, a pandemic similar to the 1918 influenza that killed 
over half a million Americans.5 Public health authorities warn that, eventually, 
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such an outbreak is a very real possibility, and could kill several times more 
people in the modern era.6 Or consider a nuclear-reactor meltdown like that in 
Chernobyl, or that almost happened in Japan following recent earthquakes. 
Minimizing deaths from such disasters requires forceful federal action, but the 
precedent that ACA challengers seek might tie federal hands. 
Insurance-mandate opponents fret over what vegetables the government 
might force them to purchase if the mandate were upheld.7 But courts, rather 
than obsessing over slippery slopes toward ridiculous mandates, should be much 
more concerned about the high hurdles to appropriate federal health action that 
a nullifying precedent would erect. As Chief Justice Marshall first reminded us 
almost two centuries ago, ours is “a Constitution intended to endure for ages to 
come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”8 
State and local public health authorities historically have been the first line 
of defense against public health and natural disasters.9 But, in the modern 
world, when local measures prove inadequate, the federal government wisely 
has contingency plans to take measures necessary to protect the public’s health 
and safety.10 The Public Health Service Act, for instance, allows the Surgeon 
General to provide for “the apprehension and examination of any individual 
reasonably believed to be infected with a communicable disease in a 
communicable stage and . . . to be a probable source of infection to individuals 
who . . . will be moving from a State to another State.”11 This authority covers 
not only those who are in active movement, but also those who might spread 
disease to people who travel. Thus, according to leading public health law 
authorities, “because virtually any infected person could be a source of 
infection to others who might be traveling from state to state, jurisdiction over 
quarantine and isolation is effectively concurrent between state and federal 
governments.”12 
Another source of emergency federal power is the Department of 
Homeland Security’s “National Response Framework.” It contains provisions 
for “catastrophic incidents,” defined as “any natural or manmade incident . . . 
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that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption 
severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, 
national morale, and/or government functions.”13 The plan recognizes that a 
catastrophic incident “could result in sustained nationwide impacts over a 
prolonged period of time [that] almost immediately exceed[] resources normally 
available to State, tribal, local, and private-sector authorities in the impacted 
area . . . . These factors drive the urgency for coordinated national planning to 
ensure accelerated Federal and/or national assistance.”14 The plan continues: 
Where State, tribal, or local governments are unable to establish or maintain an 
effective incident command structure due to catastrophic conditions, the Federal 
Government, at the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, may establish a 
unified command structure . . . to save lives, protect property, maintain operation of 
critical infrastructure/key resources (CIKR), contain the event, and protect national 
security.
15
 
Despite this mention of national security, the Commerce Clause is the 
primary—sometimes only—constitutional basis for emergency federal powers. 
For cases in which the federal government’s preparedness and response role is 
simply facilitative—providing resources and guidance, for example—Congress’s 
taxing and spending power suffices.16 Or, if disaster results from terrorism, 
military powers obviously kick into gear. For natural and public health 
disasters, however, the Commerce Clause is the critical source of power if 
strong federal measures are required.17 
According to the Congressional Research Service, the “authority of the 
federal government to prescribe quarantine and other health measures is based 
on the Commerce Clause.”18 Professor Siegel19 documents a revealing exchange 
between then-Solicitor General Kagan and Justices Scalia and Kennedy in a 
2010 oral argument. The Justices note, and Kagan agrees, that communicable 
disease falls clearly within the scope of the Commerce power. Justice Scalia 
observed: “[I]f anything relates to interstate commerce, it’s communicable 
diseases.” Kennedy remarked: “[T]hat’s a pretty easy commerce power 
argument.”20 Professor Siegel correctly explains that natural disasters sometimes 
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have direct spillover impacts on multiple states, by forcing people to relocate 
and requiring out-of-state assistance.21 
For federal response to be effective, these emergency Commerce Clause 
powers must include authority to mandate citizen behavior, regardless of 
engagement in commerce. Quarantine is the principal emergency federal power 
supported by the Commerce Clause. On its face, isolating an infected or 
exposed person might appear to merely restrict rather than compel activity, but 
quarantine orders are often coupled with behavior mandates to make them fully 
effective. 
Epidemiologists project that merely ordering everyone to stay home will not 
suffice to halt a pandemic unless there is virtually 100% compliance.22 Short of 
that, some form of mandatory “prophylaxis” will be needed, and this entails 
many forms of mandated behavior. States, for instance, routinely mandate 
vaccinations to prevent infectious disease. In more extreme situations, the 
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act includes powers to mandate 
medical examination, testing, and treatment.23 Sensible responses to a pandemic 
might entail measures as prosaic as requiring people to wash their hands or to 
purchase gauze masks.24 Yet an anti-ACA precedent would bar all of these 
federal measures, unless they are somehow conditioned on engaging in 
voluntary economic activity. 
People in quarantine or isolation at home typically are required to wear 
masks and to report their symptoms. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention’s (CDC) sample home-quarantine order, for instance, provides: 
“While in quarantine, you must wear a surgical mask at all times while in the 
presence of any individual, including any caregiver . . . . The County Health 
Department (CHD) will call your residence daily to obtain your temperature 
record, which you must take and record two times daily.”25 
Similarly, in response to the SARS outbreak in 2003, the “instructions for 
quarantine [in Toronto] included sleeping separately from others, using 
personal items (e.g., utensils and towels) exclusively (i.e., not sharing them), 
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and wearing a mask when near household members.”26 The constitutional 
principle that ACA opponents champion would bar such measures. It would be 
a very peculiar Constitution, though, that permitted quarantine but forbade 
much milder mandates, even if public health authorities insist they are needed 
to make quarantine safe and effective.27 Professor Somin suggests that such 
mandates can be conditioned on some other behavior affecting commerce,28 but 
sometimes the only behavioral hook readily available is, literally, simply 
breathing. 
It is also quite likely that emergency federal powers include authority to 
require people to turn over items of personal property. To prevent the spread 
of communicable disease in interstate commerce, “the Surgeon General may 
provide for such inspection, fumigation, disinfection, sanitation, pest 
extermination, destruction of animals or articles found to be so infected or 
contaminated as to be sources of dangerous infection to human beings, and 
other measures, as in his judgment may be necessary.”29 The statute does not 
limit this authority to only articles or animals that authorities search out on 
their own, or even to those in transit. Instead, it appears to permit requiring 
citizens themselves to affirmatively report or relinquish such dangerous items or 
animals. But this too would be forbidden by a precedent striking down the 
ACA’s mandate on the grounds that it constituted the regulation of inactivity. 
In addition to the public health mandates that federal law currently 
contemplates, consider also the possible need for Congress to further expand 
federal authority in the future, learning from prior experiences and anticipating 
new threats. Federal power to mandate evacuation or vaccination, for instance, 
might be needed to save large numbers of lives under various catastrophic 
scenarios. Professor Somin asserts that state and local authority should be 
adequate to deal with most major public health crises and natural disasters,30 but 
that hope was not borne out by Katrina,31 or even by the mild H1N1 “swine 
flu.”32 Over the past decade, each new crisis has led to studies documenting the 
inadequacy of state and local responses and calls for a more proactive federal 
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response.33 As a comprehensive report to the CDC concludes: 
The emergence of these public health threats has prompted robust efforts to improve 
United States emergency preparedness at all levels of government. While states and 
localities have traditionally had primary responsibility for conducting these kinds of 
public health activities, it has become clear that there is also a salient need for federal 
involvement in preparing for and responding to public health emergencies. . . . This 
shift represents a departure from the traditional federal-state relationship in the area 
of emergency preparedness.
34
 
Or as a House of Representatives investigative report on Katrina warns, “faith 
in federalism alone cannot sanctify a dysfunctional system in which [federal 
agencies] simply wait for requests for aid that state and local officials may be 
unable or unwilling to convey.”35 Future Katrinas, for instance, might 
necessitate mandatory federal evacuation orders. This again would appear to be 
barred by a Commerce Clause ruling that restricts the federal government from 
mandating the behavior of the general citizenry. 
State and local authorities tend to respond poorly to pandemic or mass 
casualty events not only because they are overwhelmed, but because they are 
also unaccustomed to using their strongest powers on a population-wide basis—
as opposed to more typical isolated events that affect only a few individuals.36 In 
community-wide disaster conditions, local officials may hesitate to take decisive 
action, uncertain about the full extent and proper exercise of authority under 
state law.37 According to the leading study conducted for the CDC, “our results 
paint a somewhat grim picture of the degree to which public health emergency 
preparedness stakeholders, at all levels of government, have internalized the 
relevant provisions of applicable laws and are fully prepared to act on that 
knowledge when faced with a large scale health incident.”38 
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*** 
Professor Parmet rightly warns that “[d]ogmatic and rigid visions of 
federalism can imperil the public health whether the threat is natural or 
manmade.”39 Whether it is vaccination and evacuation or merely buying gauze 
masks and reporting infectious symptoms, a fuller range of emergency federal 
powers will almost certainly include some mandated behaviors that are 
unconditioned on economic activity. If exaggerated federalist concerns produce 
an overly fastidious construction of the Commerce Clause in the fashion that 
ACA challengers request, no such federal power would be allowed. If that were 
to transpire, doomsday predictions may not be hyperbolic; instead, they may 
prove to be prophetic. 
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